Part 1 (2/2)

Since he writes this only upon a supposition, it will be time enough to answer it, when the supposition is made manifest in all its parts: In the meantime, let him give me leave to suppose too, that in case it be true that there be no Seal, yet since it is no Proclamation, but only a bare Declaration of his Majesty, to inform and satisfie his Subjects, of the reasons which induc'd him to dissolve the two last Parliaments, a Seal in this case, is not of absolute necessity: for the King speaks not here as commanding any thing, but the Printing, publis.h.i.+ng and reading.

And 'tis not denyed the meanest Englishman, to vindicate himself in Print, when he has any aspersion cast upon him. This is manifestly the case, that the Enemies of the Government, had endeavour'd to insinuate into the People such Principles, as this Answerer now publishes: and therefore his Majesty, who is always tender to preserve the affections of his Subjects, desir'd to lay before them the necessary reasons, which induc'd him to so unpleasant a thing, as the parting with two successive Parliaments. And if the Clergy obey him in so just a Design, is this to be nam'd a blind Obedience! But I wonder why our Author is so eager for the calling them to account as Accessaries to an Invective against a third Estate of the Kingdom, while he himself is guilty in almost every sentence of his discourse of aspersing the King, even in his own Person, with all the Virulency and Gall imaginable. It appears plainly that an House of Commons, is that _Leviathan_ which he Adores: that is his Sovereign in effect, and a third Estate is not only greater than the other two, but than him who is presiding over the three.

But, though our Author cannot get his own Seditious Pamphlet to be read in Churches and in Chappels, I dare secure you, he introduces it into Conventicles, and Coffee-houses of his Faction: besides, his sending it in Post Letters, to infect the Populace of every County. 'Tis enough, that this Declaration is evidently the Kings, and the only true exception, which our Answerer has to it, is that he would deny his Majesty the power of clearing his intentions to the People: and finds himself aggriev'd, that his King should satisfie them in spight of himself and of his party.

The next Paragraph is wholly spent, in giving us to understand, that a King, of _England_ is no other thing than a Duke of _Venice_; take the Parallell all along: and you will find it true by only changing of the names. A Duke of _Venice_ can do no wrong; in Senate he can make no ill Laws; in Council no ill Orders, in the Treasury can dispose of no Money, but wisely, and for the interest of the Government, and according to such proportions as are every way requisite: if otherwise all Officers are answerable, &c. Which is in effect, to say he can neither do wrong nor right, nor indeed any thing, _quatenus_ a King. This puts me in mind of _Sancho Panca_ in his Government of the Island of _Barataria_, when he was dispos'd to eat or drink, his Physitian stood up for the People, and s.n.a.t.c.h'd the dish from him in their right, because he was a publick person, and therefore the Nation must be Judges to a dram and scruple what was necessary for the sustenance of the Head of the Body politique. Oh, but there is a wicked thing call'd the Militia in their way, and they shew'd they had a moneths mind to it, at the first breaking out of the Popish Plot. If they could once persuade his Majesty, to part graciously with that trifle, and with his power of making War and Peace; and farther, to resign all Offices of Trust, to be dispos'd by their nomination, their Argument would be an hundred times more clear: for then it would be evident to all the World, that he could do nothing. But if they can work him to part with none of these, then they must content themselves to carry on their new Design beyond Seas: either of ingaging the _French_ King to fall upon _Flanders_, or encouraging the States General to lay aside, or privately to cut off the Prince of _Orange_, or getting a War declared against _England_ and _France_ conjoyntly: for by that means, either the King can be but a weak Enemy, and as they will manage matters, he shall be kept so bare of Money, that Twelve _Holland_ s.h.i.+ps shall block up the River, or he shall be forced to cast himself upon a House of Commons, and to take Money upon their Terms, which will sure be as easie, as those of an Usurer to an Heir in want. These are part of the projects now afoot: and how Loyal and conscionable they are, let all indifferent persons judge.

In the close of this Paragraph, he falls upon the King for appealing to the People against their own Representatives. But I would ask him in the first place, if an Appeal be to be made, to whom can the King Appeal, but to his People? And if he must justifie his own proceedings to their whole Body, how can he do it but by blaming their Representatives? I believe every honest man is sorry, that any such Divisions have been betwixt the King and his House of Commons. But since there have been, how could the King complain more modestly, or in terms more expressing Grief, than Indignation? or what way is left him to obviate the causes of such complaints for the future, but this gentle admonishment for what is past?

'Tis easily agreed, he says, (and here I joyn issue with him) _That there were never more occasions for a Parliament, than were at the opening of the last, which was held at_ Westminster. But where he maliciously adds, _never were our Liberties and Properties more in danger, nor the Protestant Religion more expos'd to an utter extirpation both at home and abroad_, he shuffles together Truth and Falshood: for from the greatness of _France_, the danger of the Protestant Religion is evident; But that our Liberty, Religion, and Property were in danger from the Government, let him produce the instances of it, that they may be answer'd; what dangers there were and are from the Antimonarchical Party, is not my present business to enquire. As for the growing terrour of the _French_ Monarchy, the greater it is, the more need of supply to provide against it.

_The Ministers tell us in the Declaration, That they asked of that Parliament the supporting the Alliances they had made for the Preservation of the general peace in Christendom, and had desir'd their advice and a.s.sistance for the preservation of_ Tangier: _had recommended to them, the farther examination of the Plot; and that his Majesty had offer'd to concurr in any Remedies for the security of the Protestant Religion, which might consist with the preserving the Succession of the Crown, in its due and legal course of descent, but to all this they met with most unsuitable returns._

Now mark what the Gentleman infers, _That the Ministers well knew, that their demands of Money for the ends abovesaid, were not to be complyed with, till his Majesty were pleas'd to change the hands and Councils by which his Affairs were managed_.--that is, nothing must be given but to such men in whom they could confide, as if neither the King, nor those whom he employed were fit any longer to be Trusted. But the supream power, and the management of all things, must be wholly in their Party, as it was in _Watt Tyler_, and _Jack Cade_ of famous memory, when they had got a King into their possession: for this Party, will never think his Majesty their own, till they have him as safe, as they had his Father. But if they could compa.s.s their Designs, of bringing the same Gentlemen into play once more, who some years since were at the Helm; let me ask them, when the Affairs of the Nation were worse manag'd? who gave the rise to the present greatness of the _French_? or who counsel'd the dissolution of the Tripple League? 'Tis a miracle to me that the People should think them good Patriots, only because they are out of humour with the Court, and in disgrace. I suppose they are far other principles, than those of Anger and Revenge, which const.i.tute an honest Statesman. But let men be what they will before, if they once espouse their Party, let them be touch'd with that Philosophers stone, and they are turn'd into Gold immediately. Nay, that will do more for them, than was ever pretended to by Chymistry; for it will raise up the shape of a worthy Patriot, from the ashes of a Knave. 'Tis a pretty juggle to tell the King they a.s.sist him with Money, when indeed they design only to give it to themselves; that is, to their own Instruments, which is no more, than to s.h.i.+ft it from one hand into another. It will be a favour at the long run, if they condescend to acquaint the King, how they intend to lay out his Treasure. But our Author very roundly tells his Majesty, _That at present they will give him no supplyes, because they would be employ'd, to the destruction of his Person, and of the Protestant Religion, and the inslaving the whole Nation_, to which I will only add, that of all these matters next and immediately under G.o.d, he and his Party, const.i.tute themselves the supream Judges.

_The Duke of_ York, _the Queen, and the two French Dutchesses are the great support and protectors of the Popish interest in these Kingdoms_.

How comes it to pa.s.s that our Author shuffles the two French Dutchesses together? of which the one is an _Italian_, the other a _French_ Woman, and an _English_ Dutchess? Is he grown so purblind, that he cannot distinguish Friends from Foes? Has he so soon forgotten the memory of past benefits, that he will not consider one of them as her, to whom all their applications were so lately made? Is she so quickly become an old acquaintance, that none of the politick a.s.signations at her Lodgings are remembred? After this, who will trust the grat.i.tude of a Common-wealth?

or who will blame the Conduct of a silly Court, for being over-reach'd by the whole _French_ Council, when the able part of the Nation, the designing heads, the gray wisdom, and the Beaux Garcons, are all foil'd by a single _French_ Woman, at their own Weapon, dissimulation? for the other _French_ Dutchess, since I perceive our Author is unacquainted with her Character, I will give it him; she is one who loves her ease to that degree, that no advantages of Fortune can bribe her into business.

Let her but have wherewithall to make Merry adays, and to play at Cards anights, and I dare answer for her, that she will take as little care to disturb their business, as she takes in the management of her own. But if you will say that she only affects idleness, and is a grand Intriguer in her heart, I will only Answer, that I should shew you just such another as I have describ'd her Grace, amongst the heads of your own Party: indeed I do not say it is a Woman, but 'tis one who loves a Woman.

As for the Dutchess of _M._ either she is a very sincere lover of downright idleness, or she has cousen'd all parts of Christendom, where she has wandred for these last Ten years. I hope our solid Author will pardon me this digression; but now we have had our dance, let us to our serious business.

_While these, and their Creatures are at the Helm, what can we expect for the security of the Protestant Religion, or what opposition to the ambitious designs of_ France?

I suppose more reasonably on the other side, that no such persons are at the Helm, and that what he has a.s.sum'd is but precarious. But I retort upon him, that if some of his Party were the Ministers, the Protestant Religion would receive but very cold a.s.sistance from them, who have none at all themselves. And for the growth of the _French_ Monarchy, I have already told you, to whose Counsels we are beholden for it.

_He goes on; you will tell me that the supplyes so given may be appropriated, to these particular ends of supporting our Alliances, and the relief of_ Tangier: _And it may be so limited by Act of Parliament, that it cannot be diverted to other uses. But he answers that Objection by a Story of_ Monsieur de Sully's _telling of_ H. 4th _of_ France: _let the States raise the Money, and tye it as they please; when they are dissolved, you may dispose of it as you please_.

All this is to confirm his first unalterable principle, that the King must be sure to finger nothing; but be us'd as Fishers do their Cormorant, have his mouth left open, to swallow the prey for them, but his throat gagg'd that nothing may go down. Let them bring this to pa.s.s, and afterwards they will not need to take away his Prerogative of making War: He must do that at his own peril, and be sent to fight his Enemies with his hands bound behind him. But what if he thinks not their Party fit to be intrusted, least they should employ it against his Person? why then, as he told you _they will give him nothing_. Now whose will be the fault in common reason, if the Allyances be not supported, and _Tangier_ not relieved? If they will give him nothing, before they bring him to a necessity of taking it upon their terms, asmuch as in them lyes they dissolve the Government: and the Interest of the Nation abroad must be left in the Suds, till they have destroy'd the Monarchy at home. But since G.o.d, and the Laws have put the disposing of the Treasury into his Majesties hands, it may satisfie any reasonable _Englishman_, that the same Laws have provided for the mispending of the Treasury, by calling the publick Officers into question for it before the Parliament. For G.o.d be thanked we have a House of Commons, who will be sure, never to forgoe the least t.i.ttle of their Priviledges, and not be so meal-mouth'd as the States of _France_, of whom neither Monsieur _Sully_, nor any of his Successors, have never had any cause of apprehension. But since the wisdom of our Ancestors have thought this Provision sufficient for our security, What has his present Majesty deserv'd from his Subjects, that he should be made a Minor at no less than fifty years of age? or that his House of Commons should Fetter him beyond any of his Predecessors?

_where the Interest goes, you will say, there goes the power_. But the most ingenious of your Authors, I mean _Plato Redivivus,_ broaches no such principle as that you should force this Prerogative from the King, by undue courses. The best use which can be made of all, is rather to support the Monarchy, than to have it fall upon your Heads. If indeed there were any reasonable fear of an Arbitrary Government, the adverse Party had somewhat to alledge in their defence of not supplying it; but it is not only evident, that the Kings temper is wholly averse from any such Design, but also demonstrable, that if all his Council, were such as this man most falsely suggests them to be, yet the notion of an absolute power in the Prince is wholly impracticable, not only in this Age, but for ought any wise man can foresee, at any time hereafter. 'Tis plain, that the King has reduc'd himself already to live more like a private Gentleman than a Prince; and since he can content himself in that condition, 'tis as plain, that the supplies which he demands are only for the service of the publick, and not for his own maintenance.

Monsieur _de Sully_ might give what Council he thought convenient for _Henry_ the Fourth, who was then designing that Arbitrary power, which his Successors have since compa.s.s'd, to the ruine of the Subjects liberty in _France_; but I appeal to the Consciences of those men, who are most averse to the present Government, if they think our King would put his Peace and Quiet at this time of day, upon so desperate an issue.

What the necessities, which they are driving him into, may make him part with on the other hand, I know not. But how can they answer it to our Posterity, that for private Picques, self Interest, and causeless jealousies, they would destroy the foundation of so excellent a Government, which is the admiration and envy of all _Europe_?

_The rest of my Authors Paragraph, is only laying more load upon the Ministers, and telling us, that if a sum of Money sufficient for those ends were given, while they were Managers of Affairs, it would be only to set them free from any apprehensions of account to any future Parliament_. But this Argument having only the imaginary fear of an Arbitrary power for its foundation, is already answer'd, he adds in the close of it, _That the Prince has a cheap bargain, who gives Paper-Laws in exchange of Money and Power. Bargains, he tells us, there have always been, and always will be, betwixt Prince and People, because it is in the Const.i.tution of our Goverment, and the chief dependance of our Kings is in the love and liberality of their People_.

Our present King, I acknowledge has often found it so; though no thanks I suppose to this Gentleman and his Party. But though he cry down Paper and Parchment at this Rate, they are the best Evidence he can have for his Estate, and his friends the Lawyers will advise him to speak with less contempt of those Commodities. If Laws avail the Subject nothing, our Ancestors have made many a bad Bargain for us. Yet I can instance to him one Paper, namely, that of the _Habeas Corpus_ bill; for which the House of Commons would have been content to have given a Million of good _English_ money, and which they had Gratis from his Majesty. 'Tis true, they boast they got it by a Trick; but if the Clerk of the Parliament had been bidden to forget it, their Trick of telling Noses might have fail'd them. Therefore let us do right on all sides: The Nation is oblig'd both to the House of Commons for asking it, and more especially to his Majesty, for granting it so freely.

_But what can we think of his next Axiome, that it was never known that Laws signified any thing to a People, who had not the sole guard of their own Prince, Government and Laws?_

Here all our Fore-fathers are Arraign'd at once for trusting the Executive power of the Laws in their Princes hands. And yet you see the Government has made a s.h.i.+ft to shuffle on for so many hundred years together, under this miserable oppression; and no man so wise in so many ages to find out, that _Magna Charta_ was to no purpose, while there was a King. I confess in Countreys, where the Monarck governs absolutely, and the Law is either his Will, or depending on it, this n.o.ble maxim might take place; But since we are neither _Turks_, _Russians_, nor _Frenchmen_, to affirm that in our Countrey, in a Monarchy of so temperate and wholsom a Const.i.tution, Laws are of no validity, because they are not in the disposition of the People, plainly infers that no Government but that of a Common-wealth can preserve our Liberties and Priviledges: for though the t.i.tle of a Prince be allow'd to continue, yet if the People must have the sole guard and Government of him and of the Laws, 'tis but facing an whole hand of Trumps, with an insignificant King of another sute. And which is worst of all, if this be true, there can be no Rebellion, for then the People is the supream power. And if the Representatives of the Commons shall Jarr with the other two Estates, and with the King, it would be no Rebellion to adhere to them in that War: to which I know that every Republican who reads this, must of necessity Answer, _No more it would not_. Then farewell the Good Act of Parliament, which makes it Treason to Levy Arms against the present King, upon any pretences whatsoever. For if this be a Right of Nature, and consequently never to be Resign'd, there never has been, nor ever can be any pact betwixt King and People, and Mr. _Hobbs_ would tell us, _That we are still in a state of War_.

_The next thing our Author would establish, is, That there is nothing in Nature or in Story so ridiculous, as the management of the Ministers, in the Examination of the Popish Plot. Which being prov'd by_ Coleman's _and others Letters, and by both Houses by declaring the King's Life to be in danger_, &c. _Yet they have persuaded the King to believe nothing of this danger; but to apprehend the Plot to be extreamly improv'd, if not wholly contriv'd by the Presbyterians. And to think it more his concernment to have an end of all; then to have it search'd to the bottom: and that this was the true reason, why four Parliaments, during the Examination of the Plot have been dissolv'd:_

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